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NAFTA'S RULES OF ORIGIN FOR AUTOMOBILES:
A NEED FOR REFORM
SABRENA A. SIL VER
INTRODUCTION
Is the ketchup that President Bill Clinton pours over his french fries
and Big MaeO' American? Not for purposes of the North American
Free Trade Agreement.2 According to NAFTA's rules of origin,3 for
ketchup to fit within the definition of "North American" and, thereby,
1. See Amy Wallace, American Culture on a Bun, L.A. Times, Dec. 30, 1993, at AI
(discussing the anniversary of the Big Mac and recounting, "[a]nyone who says Clinton
doesn't inhale... never saw him around a Big Mace").
2. North America Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 296
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]. For a discussion of the ratifica-
tion process, see Jane Bussey, Pact's Effect Wouldn't Be Felt Instantly. Plan Calls for
Barriers to be Slowly Phased Out, Miami Herald, Oct. 18, 1993, at 9A.
The parties to NAFTA developed the agreement in accordance with Article XXIV of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") which defines and allows free
trade agreements. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, 555 U.N.T.S. 187, art. XXIV 8(a)-(b) [hereinafter GATT]; NAFTA art. 101. (claim-
ing compliance with GATT). See also Trade Policies for a Better Future: The Leutwiler
Report, The GATT and the Uruguay Round (Arthur Dunkel ed. 1987); Richard W.T.
Pohfret Unequal Trade (1988); Andrew W. Shoyer, Trade in Goods Under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in Mexico-Investment and Trade: Progress
and Prospects 1993, at 9 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series, 1993).
GATT permits free trade areas despite the fact that they discriminate against parties to
GATT who do not participate in them. The theory is that although the free trade area
members discriminate against nonmembers, this promote the ultimate goal of GATT,
the eventual elimination of trade barriers. See David E. Marko, A Critical Review of
Market Access in Central And Eastern Europe: The European Community's Role, 17 Md.
J. Int'l L. & Trade 1, 7 (1993).
Under GATT, members normally must grant all other members most favored nation
("MFN") status. See GATT art. XXVIII. GATT allows members of free trade agree-
ments to withhold FTA benefits to non-free trade area GATT members only if certain
conditions are met. See GATT art. XXIV. First, all duties and restrictive measures must
be eliminated substantially between the parties. See GATT art. XXIV 8(b). Second,
each contracting party in the free trade area must treat the other parties' goods no less
favorably than its own. See id NAFTA ostensibly meets these requirements. See Rich-
ard H. Steinberg, Antidotes to Regionalism: Responses to Trade Diversion Effects of the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 29 Stan. J. Int'l L. 315, 337 (1993) (noting that
GATT parties will assess the trade area's effects on trade as a whole rather than the
effects on individual products in assessing GATT compliance).
Specifically, NAFTA's objectives are to: (a) eliminate barriers to trade in goods be-
tween the territories of the Parties; (b) to promote fair competition in the free trade area;
(c) to increase the investment opportunities throughout the Parties; (d) to protect ade-
quately intellectual property rights of each Party; (e) to create effective procedures for
joint administration of the agreement and joint resolution of related disputes; and (f) to
establish a framework to further "trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation to ex-
pand and enhance the benefits" of the Agreement. See NAFTA art. 102. In the words of
Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Dortari,
[o]ur objective at all times during the [NAFTA] negotiations was to make the
agreement consistent with GATT. This insures that no protectionist barriers
against outside countries or regions will be erected around the huge North
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qualify for duty-free4 treatment the tomato puree must originate from
American trade area. NAFTA is thus a building block of GATT, not a trade
bloc formed at the expense of others....
Nathan Gardels, Salinas' Vision: After NAFTA, the World, L.A. Times, Jan. 6, 1993, at
B7.
In recent years, GATT parties have chosen to build free trade areas rather than to
liberalize their trade laws universally or to construct customs unions. See Paul B. Ste-
phan III, International Business and Economics: Law and Policy 80 (1993). Free trade
area members import goods duty-free from each other. See id. However, they do not
have common external tariffs, or a common customs frontier, as does the European Com-
munity. See id.
NAFTA, in fact, is only the most recent free trade area to which the United States
belongs. In 1985, it joined its first general free trade agreement, the Israel-United States
accord. See Israel-United States: Free Trade Area Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, reprinted
in 24 I.L.M. 654 [hereinafter U.S.-Israel FTA]. Later, in 1988, it joined the Canada-
United States: Free-Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1987, 102 Stat. 1851, reprinted in 27 I.L.M.
281 [hereinafter CFTA].
3. NAFTA dedicates an entire chapter to determining whether a good originates
within the member states for purposes of the agreement. See NAFTA ch. IV. In addi-
tion, hundreds of pages of appendices detail the rules. See NAFTA annex 301. The rules
are as important as they are complicated, because only originating goods are eligible for
preferential tariff treatment. See NAFTA ch. IV.
The problem of origin arises most often in the case of products containing parts from
several countries-hybrid products. This issue may become more clear through a hypo-
thetical.
Imagine a free trade agreement between Patria and Xandia. See Frederic P. Cantin &
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Rules of Origin, The Canada-U.S. FTA, and the Honda Case, 87
Am. J. Int'l L. 375, 376 (1993). If all of a product's components originate from within
the joint territories of Patria and Xandia, then the product receives duty-free treatment in
passing between the two countries. See id. However, where a product has components,
some of which are imported from Tertia, the issue becomes what test the product must
pass to acquire Patrian or Xandian citizenship. See id.
Because member states do not maintain a "common customs frontier", see supra note
2, rules of origin are especially important in free trade agreements. See Stephan, supra
note 2, at 89. The rules of origin prevent duty-free exportation of goods from a country
with a lower tariff to that with a higher tariff. See id. For example, if German
automobiles were to carry a 15 percent tariff in Canada and a 25 percent tariff in the
United States, importers would always ship German cars through Canada and transfer
them duty free to the United States. See id. Therefore, in this hypothetical, rules of
origin would have to be used to prevent the German cars from obtaining duty free entry
from Canada to the United States.
4. Duties are taxes on imports. See generally Blacks Law Dictionary 505 (6th ed.
1990). The United States levies two types of duties under its foreign trade law. See
Gesine Schmidt & Olaf Jansen, Regular Organization of United States Foreign Trade, in
U.S. Trade Barriers: A Legal Analysis 107, 108 (Eberhard Grabitz & Armin von
Bogdandy eds., 1991) [hereinafter U.S. Trade Barriers]. The United States Customs Ser-
vice imposes regular duties according to predetermined schedules. For a discussion of
these schedules, see infra Part I.B. In addition, there are special duties which result from
administrative proceedings of the Department of Commerce and the International Trade
Commission. See Schmidt & Jansen, supra, at 108-09. These duties are invoked through
countervailing duty or antidumping statutes. See id. For a brief discussion of the role of
rule of origin determinations in the application of statutes such as these, see infra Part
I.A.
NAFTA provides that no party may increase or adopt any customs duty on originating
goods of another party, except as otherwise provided. See NAFTA art. 302(1). Regular
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within the territories' of the members to the agreement.6 Much of the
tomato pur6e used by American ketchup producers, however, comes
from Chile.7 Thus, American producers must either pay a duty on
ketchup shipped to Canada and Mexico, or discontinue contracting with
Chilean puree suppliers."
Although NAFTA in fact contains hundreds of these goods-specific9
rules of origin, few likely will engender as much controversy as those
governing automobiles. Similar rules of origin for automotive products
spurred tremendous administrative and political battles under the United
States Canadian Free Trade Agreement. Moreover, although the mem-
ber states undertook to rectify the problems with the CFTA's rules in
NAFTA negotiations, the final formulations only will partially promote
the goals of NAFTA.
Under NAFTA's rules of origin for automobiles and automobile parts,
customs duties on originating goods must be gradually phased out according to the
Schedule to Annex 302.2.
Nonetheless, the parties may impose tariffs under specified emergency conditions. See.
e.g. NAFTA annex 300-B.4.1. (Textile and Apparel Goods Bilateral Emergency Actions
(Tariff Actions)). Where a textile or apparel good originating in a member state is being
imported into another member state's territory
in such increased quantities, in absolute terms or relative to the domestic mar-
ket for that good, and under such conditions as to cause serious damage, or
actual threat thereof, to a domestic industry producing a like or directly com-
petitive good, the importing Party may... increase the rate of duty on the good
within certain parameters. Id
5. NAFTA thoroughly elaborates the meaning of "territories" of the parties. See
NAFTA annex 201.1 (Country-Specific Definitions). The Canadian territory includes
the territory to which its customs laws apply. See NAFTA annex 201.1(a). The Mexican
territory includes the states of the Federation, the Federal District, and islands (including
the island of Guadalupe). See NAFTA annex 201.1(b). Lastly, the territory of the
United States includes the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. See
NAFTA annex 201.1(c). The territory of each state also includes the rights of each to
the seas and subsoil in accordance with international law. See id.
6. See generally NAFTA annex 401-159 (outlining requirements for origination of
vegetable preparations).
7. See Bussey, supra note 2, at 9A.
8. See id Ketchup is a new tariff item (number 2103.20.aa). See NAFTA annex
401-158 (new tariff items). Ketchup falls within Chapter 21 of the Harmonized System,
Miscellaneous Edible Preparations. To qualify for duty free treatment under this chap-
ter, ketchup must change to heading 2103.20 from any other chapter. However, tomato
puree belongs to the same chapter. Therefore, it may not travel between the member
states duty-free. If unprocessed Chilean tomatoes were imported, they would be classified
under Chapter 8, Edible Fruit and Nuts, and ketchup made from them would travel
duty-free.
Thus, because tomato puree belongs to the same chapter as ketchup, non-NAFTA
puree may never be converted to ketchup and acquire duty-free treatment between the
parties. Moreover, the costs of the other ingredients, the bottle, and processing are irrele-
vant. The only requirement for duty-free treatment of this product is a change in the
tariff classification of all imported sub-elements.
9. According to NAFTA, goods include domestic products as understood in the
GATT and include the originating goods of a party. See NAFTA art. 201. In plain
english, the term goods refers to "commercial merchandise." See Schmidt & Jansen,
supra note 4, at 107.
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to qualify for duty-free treatment, a good must (1) undergo a change in
tariff classification, 0 and (2) satisfy a value-added test requiring over 60
percent of its value to originate within the free trade area." As under
the CFTA, the value-added requirement will cause inconsistent and
anomalous origin determinations.12
The value added component to the CFTA rules of origin generated
bitter disputes between the United States and Canada 3 and made poten-
tial investors wary. 4 The CFTA signatories disputed the types of costs
that should be included in calculating how much value was added in
North America. 5 The United States Customs Service, 16 pursuant to its
view of the type of value that may be included in value assessment, dis-
qualified Canadian automobiles from duty-free treatment (subjecting the
autos to import tariffs). The Customs Service determined that the Cana-
dian cars contained too much non-originating value. The specter of ad-
ded tariff costs caused foreign investors to become ambivalent about
producing within the trade area.17
10. "The process of classification may be described as the process of selecting the
specific description of imports that most properly applies to the particular import
presented for classification." Schmidt & Jansen, supra note 4, at 133.
11. A value-added test generally requires that for a product to originate in a country
it must contain a certain percentage of value contributed in that country. See id. at 137.
12. This Note primarily address rules of origin for automobiles. Difficulties similar to
those encountered with these provisions have occurred in other industrial sectors, how-
ever, and provide fertile examples of the problems inherent in rule of origin definitions.
There have been, for instance, disputes in previous agreements concerning the origin of
rolled steel and concerning the origin of textile products. See infra Part I.B. Throughout
the Note, these examples help elucidate the difficulties of automotive provisions.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See Jeffrey J. Schott & Gary C. Hufbauer, Negotiating and Implementing a North
American Free Trade Agreement 68-69 (Leonard Waverman ed., 1992) (noting that the
rules of origin under the CFTA provided a "goldmine" for accountants and lawyers and
led some firms to prefer paying the tariffs to completing the paperwork); Treasury Official
Notes Effort to Move Away from Value-Content Test in Chemical Sector, 10 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 10, 417 (Mar. 10, 1993) (citation omitted).
15. See supra Part II.A.
16. The Customs Service is a branch of the United States Treasury Department. See
19 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994). The entirety of the organization is currently being restructured
pursuant to the Customs Reorganization Act-implemented with NAFTA.
The most pervasive change by the act is that it shifts the valuation and classification of
merchandise to the importer. See Customs Explores Reductions in Staff, Establishing
Strategic Trade Centers, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 343 (Mar. 2, 1994). Ac-
cording to the Customs Service, the importer's legal responsibility is to use "reasonable
care" in providing the service with information. See id. This additional burden on the
importer may further erode the attractiveness of using tariff preferences.
17. Japanese trade officials consider NAFTA's rules of origin to be "sneaky protec-
tionism," see David Everett, Fine Print on Free Trade: NAFTA Partners Put Their Inter-
ests First, Det. Free Press, Nov. 3, 1993, at IE, designed to create a "Fortress America."
See Chwee Huay Ow-Taylor, Facing the Challenge from NAFTA, Bus. Times, Jul. 28,
1993, at 23.
The Japanese are not alone in their criticism of NAFTA. Many recently industrialized
economies in Asia, including Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, also fear
that NAFTA's rules of origin will cause them considerable trade difficulty. See Morin
Mushkat, Eastern Asia: East Asia's Laid-Back Stance on NAFTA Points to Problem of
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Trade representatives endeavored to craft NAFTA's automobile rules
of origin to avoid the CFTA's difficulties." For instance, NAFTA clari-
fies the type of value considered to be within the originating value of
automobiles and their components, adopting a more expansive
definition.19
NAFrA, however, fails to remedy the greatest cause of the contro-
versy under the CFTA, the Customs Service's interpretation of the auto-
mobile rules of origin value-added component.20 Under the CFTA, the
Customs Service disallowed certain American processing costs that, ac-
cording to a dispute resolution panel, should have been included.2"
Policy Inertia, Japan Econ. J./Nikkei Weekly, Dec. 13, 1993, available in WESTLAW,
Int-News Database.
Specifically, the apparel, automobile, and auto parts industries of these countries risk
not only trade diversion, but also investment diversion. See id.; Jonathan Marshall,
NAFTA Could Divert Trade From Asia, S.F. Chron., Nov. 17, 1993, at C4. Mexico's
attraction of investment rose sharply after the introduction of economic stabilization and
trade liberalization programs in 1985. See iL Investment increased further as NAFTA
negotiations proceeded and the agreement was ratified. See id.; Anna Taing, Malaysia:
East Asia Faces Big NAFTA Challenge-Lehmans, Bus. Times (Malaysia), Dec. 15, 1993,
at 1.
The term "fortress" has long been used to describe so-called protectionist trade prac-
tices. Some Europeans have called for a Fortress Europe to combat what they perceive as
Japanese protectionism. See William Drozdiak, Europe's New Rage: Japan-Bashing Fear
of Tokyo 'Economic War Plan' Spreads as Unified Market Nears, Wash. Post, June 16,
1991, at A19. But see, United Yes; Fortress, No, Says Europe, Chi. Trib., Oct. 20, 1988, at
1. In addition, European Community restrictions on Japanese cars sold in Western Eu-
rope, even on those made in Europe by Japanese owned companies, led to cries of For-
tress Europe from outside the community. See Paul Blustein & Stuart Auerbach, Trade
Blocs: Friend or Foe? Some Asian Nations Fear New Regional Groupings May Foster Pro-
tectionism, Wash. Post, June 2, 1991, at HI; Katherine Langley, The Fortress Faces East:
Protecting Europe's Auto Industry, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 1043, 1043 (1991) (arguing that
despite "the EC's promises that Community-wide legislation will not yield 'Fortress Eu-
rope,' protectionism is still the overriding goal of European trade regulation.").
In addition, the single European financial market-a product of the Single European
Act-has led United States business interests to cry "Fortress Europe." See Dr. Gerhard
Wegen, Transnational Financial Services-Current Challenges for an Integrated Europe,
60 Fordham L. Rev. S91, S95 (1992). Former President Bush's reference to the "iron
curtain of protection" descending on Europe also reflects the United States perception of
the European Economic Community as a Fortress Europe. See Hobart Rowen, U.S.
German Officials Need to GA 7T Together, Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 1992, at HI.
In addition, Japanese business and government leaders have publicly acknowledged
outsiders' inability to penetrate their market, noting the accuracy of the term "Fortress
Japan." See Paul Blustein, Tokyo Woes: Shoring Up a Shaky Summit: Will the US-
Japan Trade Rift Wreck Global Cooperation?, Wash. Post, July 4, 1993, at Cl.
18. See infra Part III.A. Among its modifications, NAFTA has actually incorpo-
rated some provisions specific to certain brands of products. For example, Annex 403.2
relates specifically to the Regional Value-Content Calculation for CAMI Automotive,
Inc. when producing motor vehicles in Canada for importation to the United States.
Although these agreements are in themselves interesting, this discussion of rules of origin
focuses on the rules generally applicable, rather than on company-specific provisions.
19. See id
20. See id
21. The CFTA created dispute resolution panels to resolve various types of contro-
versies under the agreement. The panels included appointed representatives of both
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Indeed, there was a collective proclivity to misconstrue value-added
definitions. Canada also read the CFTA rules of origin to promote its
own interests. By adopting a broad definition of value, Canada en-
couraged foreign producers to invest in Canadian production facilities to
supply the United States market.22
Notwithstanding, under NAFTA, value-added determinations must
become more predictable,23 uniform,24 and compatible with the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")25 than determinations under
the CFTA. These are prerequisites to the benefits of free trade: increased
investment 26 and improved economies of scale.27 This Note evaluates the
countries. See CFTA art. 1801. The signatory countries may request consultations "re-
garding any actual or proposed measure or any other matter that it considers affects the
operation of [the] Agreement." CFTA art. 1805.
Only one panel decision under the CFTA concerns rules of origin. See In the Matter of
Article 304 and the Definition of Direct Cost of Processing or Direct Cost of Assembling,
USA-92-1807-01, Canada-U.S. Trade Comm'n Panel, Final Report (June 8, 1992) [here-
inafter In the Matter of Article 304]. For a discussion of this decision, see infra Part II.A.
22. See infra Part II.A.2.
23. Predictability is crucial to promote foreign investment in the free trade area. In
fact, the unpredictability of CFTA rules of origin, together with substantial accounting
requirements, prevented manufacturers from taking advantage of reduced tariffs. See in-
fra Part II.B.
24. Uniformity is required to prevent a member state with lower tariffs from serving
as a platform for the duty free entry of goods into a member state with higher tariffs. One
commentator has observed that uniformity has long been a problem. See National and
International Developments in the Rules of Origin and Duty Drawback, in Proceedings of
the Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of International
Trade, 137 F.R.D. 509, at 581, 590 (1990) (comment of John Rode) [hereinafter Develop-
ments in Rules of Origin]. Uniformity has been a problem since the city states of Europe,
particularly Venice, traded spices throughout the Middle and Near East under a regime
of Most Favored Nation treatment. See id.
25. See infra Part I.C. (discussing GATT's prohibition of the protectionist use of
rules of origin in non-preferential contexts).
The Uruguay Round agreement creates a World Trade Organization ("WTO") to re-
place the GATT-Bretton Woods trading system. Draft Agreement on Rules of Origin,
Dec. 20, 1991, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA, § D.1-14 [hereinafter "Uruguay
GATT"]. The WTO will provide punitive measures for GATT violations and, thereby,
occupy a more influential role in global trade. See South Korea: Trade After Uruguay
Round, Korea Econ. Daily, Dec. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
CURNWS File.
26. See John M. Berry, Economists Say Blocs May Block Free Trade, Regional Ac-
cords Seen as Troubling, Wash Post, Sept. 4, 1991, at Cl (quoting Mexican Finance Min-
ister Pedro Aspe in saying that a free trade agreement "will make possible a better use of
economies of scale and will generate new investment and employment opportunities");
William Branigin, Mexico Eyes Pacts with U.S., Canada; President Salinas Rules Out Any
European-Style Common Market, Wash. Post, May 24, 1990, at El (noting that Salinas
has come to believe that a lesser-developed country can reap great benefits from a free
trade agreement, including new investment, technology transfers and wage increases for
Mexican workers).
27. To say that a free trade agreement will achieve economies of scale is to say that it
will allow businesses to produce where it is most cost efficient. Ultimately, these econo-
mies benefit consumers who enjoy lower prices. See Alexander Trotman, We Are Much
More Competitive Now, But I Am Not In the Least Bit Complacent About the Japanese,
Det. Free Press, Feb. 9, 1994, at llA.
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value-added components of NAFTA's rules of origin for automobiles
and surveys the mechanisms available in NAFTA and GATT to revise
them.
Part I of this Note surveys rules of origin. Such rules arise not only in
free trade agreements, but also in quotas, countervailing and antidump-
ing duties, and national technical requirements.2" They are becoming an
increasingly important aspect of international trade. Part I also traces
the modem trend to adopt more objective standards in developing rules
of origin. Part II addresses the CFTA rules of origin for automobiles
and disputes between the United States and Canada on the interpretation
of these rules. Part III evaluates NAFTA's rules of origin. This Part
also details rules of origin coordination provisions-under both NAFTA
and GATT. This Note concludes that the United States should cooper-
ate with the other NAFTA member states-through both NAFTA and
GATT provisions-to develop NAFTA's rules of origin in harmony
with GATT principles.
I. SPECIES OF ORIGIN
Rules of origin, which vary greatly in form, occupy an important role
in divergent trade contexts. The importance of these rules has led to a
global trend to implement more objective criteria to achieve consistent
results. This Part surveys the trade contexts in which rules of origin
apply, and traces the historical approach to origin determinations. This
study reveals the importance of consistency in origin determinations.
A. Trade Contexts Employing Rules of Origin
Rules of origin are crucial to the development of a free trade area. A
free trade area grants its duty-free benefits exclusively to member state
goods.2 9 Rules of origin determine whether a given good originates
within the member states and, therefore, qualifies for duty-free treatment.
Free trade areas, however, are not the only context in which trade bene-
fits are dependent on a product's national origin.
Over the last twenty years, rules of origin have become exceedingly
important as nations have increasingly relied on tariff preferences, "buy
national" requirements, voluntary restraint agreements, and antidump-
ing and countervailing duty orders to open markets for some products
and producers and to close markets for others.30 All these policies re-
quire the use of rules of origin.
Outside free trade areas, many industrialized countries treat goods of
28. For a discussion of the full range of trade areas using rules of origin, see infra Part
I.A.
29. See supra note 2.
30. See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Growing Importance of Rules of Ori-
gin, in Trade Law And Policy Institute 1989, at 211, 213-15 (PLI Com. L. & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 510, 1989).
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developing countries preferentially.3 For example, since 1975, the
United States has applied a General System of Preferences to allow prod-
ucts from specified developing countries to enter the United States duty-
free.3 2 To ensure that only the specified countries take advantage of the
preferential treatment, the GSP includes strict rules of origin that allow
the Customs Service to determine product eligibility.33 The European
Community maintains similar programs to accord preferences to the
North African countries that are former European colonies, such as Mo-
rocco.34 Thus, both free trade agreements and developing country pro-
grams use rules of origin to grant preferential treatment to certain goods.
Other agreements, however, use rules of origin to prevent the importa-
tion of, or to discriminate against, other countries' goods. Voluntary re-
straint agreements are one method. For example, the United States has
entered into voluntary restraint agreements to limit foreign steel produ-
cers' shipment of steel into the United States market. 36 To avoid the
importing country's imposition of legislated import restraints or quotas,
the producing country agrees to restrict its exports. Japan, for example,
voluntarily restrains its automotive and electronics exports to Europe
and the United States. 37 Although voluntary restraint agreements con-
travene free trade38 and may violate GATT 39 because they distort the
31. See GATT Contracting Parties, Decision of Nov. 28, 1979, Differential and More
Favorable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries,
GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 203 (26th Supp. 1980) [hereinafter
BISD]. See also Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 Am. J.
Int'l L. 705, 750 (1988) ("While GSP is inconsistent with MFN, it coheres with the
underlying purpose of GATT, which is to increase trade for all nations.") The GATT
grants waivers to MFN requirements in the case of programs to assist developing
countries.
32. The United States GSP was enacted in 1974. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2461 (1994). The statute authorizes the president "to provide duty-free treatment for
any eligible article from any beneficiary developing country." Id.
33. See Bello & Holmer, supra note 30, at 217.
34. See id. Morocco was formerly a colony of France.
35. The United States has a long tradition of voluntary restraint agreements. Some
commentators suggest that these agreements date back to the 1930's-to agreements with
Japan to limit the importation of cloth, floor coverings, hosiery, velveteen, and corduroy
products. See Jeanette Schiiler, Voluntary Export Restraints, in U.S. Trade Barriers,
supra note 4, at 463, 474. There have also been more recent agreements. For example,
on May 1, 1981, the United States and Japan signed a Voluntary Restraint Agreement on
automobiles to last three years. See Twenty-Seventh Annual Report of the President on the
Trade Agreements Program, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 234, Feb. 19, 1986. This restricted
imports of passenger cars by 8%. See id. Various transition agreements have since tran-
spired. See Schiller, supra, at 474.
36. See generally Jose A. Mendez, The Short-Run Trade & Employment Effects of
Steel Import Restraints, 20 J. World Trade L. 554, n. 154 and accompanying text (noting
that those agreements would reduce steel imports and preserve employment in the Amer-
ican steel industry).
37. Because Japanese products often undergo processing in third countries, importing
countries often dispute whether a given good is Japanese and falls within the restraint
agreement.
38. See e.g. Peter Wong, The Japanese Automotive Voluntary Restraint Agreements
and International Law, 23 Canadian Y.B. Int'l L. 297, 302 (1985) (equating the agree-
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flow of goods in the international market," they continue to exist and to
depend on rules of origin.
Another restriction based on rules of origin is a "buy national" re-
quirement.41 This type of regulation restricts the range of products eligi-
ble for government procurement to domestically-produced articles.42
For example, to bid on a contract to provide defense equipment to the
United States,4" the bidder's product must originate within the United
States. The rule aims to protect domestic industries."
Although GATT generally prohibits buy national requirements, it pro-
vides an exception for government procurement.45 As governments have
played a larger role in economic development, however, markedly more
trade has come within the governmental procurement exemption. 46 Be-
cause buy national requirements retain their vitality in the government
procurement area, rules of origin will continue to be important in this
context.
Origin determinations concerning national technical requirements may
also divert imports, although the role of origin determinations here is
slightly more tenuous. For example, under United States emission stan-
dards, automobile producers must maintain an average fuel efficiency rat-
ing for their domestically produced fleets.4' The rule forces United States
ments to an indirect form of legislated import quotas); Michael W. Lochmann, The Japa-
nese Voluntary Restraint on Automobile Exports: An Abandonment of the Free Trade
Principles of the GA 77and the Free Market Principles of United States Antitrust Laws, 27
Harv. Int'l L.J. 99, Ill (1986) (stating that the gain realized with voluntary export re-
straints in effect is less than would be derived through free trade).
39. See GATT art. XI (prohibiting quantitative restrictions on the importation of
goods). Voluntary restraint agreements are informal bilateral agreements and violate the
principle of non-discrimination. See GATT art. XIII. ("No... restriction shall be ap-
plied by any contracting party ... on the exportation of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party, unless the exportation of the like product, to all
third countries, is similarly... restrained.")
40. Such agreements entrench trade disparities between parties. See Starla Henrichs-
Cohen, EEC Treaty Article 115 - the Surviving Safeguard: Ridding Residual Member
State Protection in the Single Market, 24 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 553, 553-55 (1993).
Moreover, such measures lack transparency and, therefore, prevent regulation. See id.
41. The first federal statute to introduce "buy American" preferences was in 1845.
See Appropriations Law for Fiscal Year 1845, 28th Congress, Sess I., 5 Stat. 681, ch. 105
(1844) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 109 (1988)). It precluded the purchase of foreign products
where suitable domestic products could be obtained at reasonable prices. See id.
42. See generally Schmidt & Jansen, supra note 4, at 108-09.
43. See e.g. 10 U.S.C. § 2507(d) (1988) (providing that specified tools must be
purchased domestically by the Department of Defense for fiscal years 1989-1991).
44. See Schmidt & Jansen, supra note 4, at 110.
45. See GATT, Agreement on Government Procurement, in BISD, supra note 31, at
33.
46. See Geraldo Pascual, Note, State Buy American Laws in a World of Liberal
Trade, 7 Conn. J. Int'l L. 311, 312 (1992).
47. The manufacturers normally would be able to include only those cars that they
produce in the United States in their average. See Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Regulations ("CAFE"), 40 C.F.R. § 600.513 (1981). CAFE imposes a "gas guzzler" tax
on automobile fleets with low average fuel efficiency. See id. However, Mexico has won a
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manufacturers to produce enough fuel efficient cars domestically to meet
the requisite average domestic car efficiency threshold after accounting
for domestic luxury car production.48 The domestic fuel efficiency stan-
dard thereby forces United States manufacturers to produce their most
fuel efficient cars in the United States.
Antidumping and countervailing duty laws also rely on origin determi-
nations. Antidumping duties penalize foreign producers for unfairly
pricing.49 Countervailing duties address governmental behavior, includ-
ing subsidizing5 ° firms to sell at unfair prices in foreign markets."1 These
measures only apply to designated countries and a product's treatment
depends on its country of origin. For example, European Community
rules of origin prevent the Japanese from merely assembling goods, in so-
called "screwdriver" (or assembly) plants, to avoid antidumping or coun-
tervailing duty laws imposed against Japanese products.52
Common to all of these uses of rules of origin is the need to determine
where a given good originates. Some methods of assessment, however,
may reveal more consistent results than others. For this reason, an anal-
ysis of the types of tests used is crucial. Although this note addresses the
need for reform only in the context of NAFTA's automobile rules of
origin, the analysis may apply equally to other contexts of origin determi-
nations discussed above.
B. Methods of Determining the Country of Origin
Traditionally, countries have relied on rules of "substantial transfor-
mation," an assessment of whether a product has undergone ample meta-
morphosis in a given location, to decide a product's country of origin.
Such formulations, however, are vague, difficult to implement and, more
importantly, unpredictable for investors. These characteristics make the
substantial transformation test undesirable in the free trade context.
Consequently, recent free trade agreements, including the CFTA and
NAFTA, have adopted alternative systems based on a change in Harmo-
nized System tariff classification. 3 A Harmonized System framework
concession under NAFTA that American cars produced in Mexico may be included in
determining American fuel efficiency calculations. See NAFTA annex 300-A.
48. For a discussion of the American automobile companies' tendency to reduce their
average fuel consumption by including fuel-efficient cars in their averages, see Julie Wolf,
US Is Taxed With Discriminating Against European Cars, The Guardian, May 12, 1993,
at 11.
49. See Stephan, supra note 2, at 88.
50. For a discussion of subsidies, see Gillian Dell, Indirect Restrictions on Foreign
Trade in U.S. Trade Barriers, supra note 4, at 503, 555-57.
51. See id.
52. The European Community has struggled to ensure that only member states bene-
fit from their Customs Union. See Patrick J. McDermott, Note, Extending the Reach of
Their Antidumping Laws: The European Community's 'Screwdriver Assembly' Regulation,
20 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 315, 316 (1988).
53. International Convention of the Harmonized Description and Coding System,
June 14, 1983 [hereinafter Harmonized System]. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3012 (1988).
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improves upon the substantial transformation test in that it is more ob-
jective and more widely used across the globe.
The current agreements using the Harmonized System, however, have
compromised the system's benefits by combining the system with value-
added requirements. These value-added requirements introduce a sub-
stantial element of indeterminacy in an otherwise greatly improved sys-
tem. This indeterminacy has spurred the battles under the CFTA, and
remains in the wings to reek havoc under NAFTA.
1. The Rule of Substantial Transformation
Trade agreement rules of origin traditionally have used vague and un-
predictable 4 rules of substantial transformation." Under this type of
test, no one factor is determinative.5 6 Rather, the substantial transforma-
tion query assesses whether there is a change in the "commercial
The United States Omnibus Trade and Competition Act of 1988 implements the Interna-
tional Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System and
the Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the United States. These new tariff schedules replace
the old Tariff Schedules and conform to the schedules of the world's major trading coun-
tries. See Mark R. Joelson, et al., U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
16 Int'l Bus. Law. 408, 413 (1988).
54. See Edward H. Davis, Jr., Comment, National Juice Products Association v.
United States: A Substantial Transformation of the Country-of-Origin Substantial Trans-
formation Test?, 19 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 493, 497 (1987-88) (stating that applica-
tion of the rule is difficult when the country of export is an intermediary); David
Palmeter, Rules of Origin or Rules of Restriction? A Commentary on a New Form of
Protectionism, 11 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1, 10 (1987) (describing judicial confusion in inter-
preting the rule of substantial transformation). See also Paul Asker, Note, Changes in the
Rules of Origin in the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: A Preliminary Evalu-
ation, 36 Wayne L. Rev. 1545, 1549 (1990).
55. See 19 C.F.R. § 134.1(b); Ruth F. Sturm, I Customs Law & Admin. § 15.1
(1993). Among the United States agreements which rely on this test is the Caribbean
Basin Initiative. See William H. Cavitt, Western Hemisphere Free Trade Initiatives, 18
Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 271, 286 (1992).
Other countries also recognize the rule of substantial transformation. For example, the
European Community recognizes the rule. See Peter Montagnon, EC Unable to Bar
Hondas Made in US, Says UK Minister, Fin. Times (London), Jan. 9, 1991, at 4. Under
this test, Japanese cars undergoing substantial transformation in the United States would
not be counted against Japanese quotas. See Cars Renewed Controversy on Japanese
Transplants, Eur. Rep. (Eur. Info. Serv., Brussels), Jan. 12, 1991, at 7; Com" Freeze on
Japanese Imports into EEC until January 1, 2000, Transp. Eur., (Eur. Info. Serv., Brus-
sels), Sept. 25, 1991. The EC has many rules for specific products. See, eg., Council
Regulation 37/70, 1970 O.J. (L 7) 6 (pertaining to spare parts); Council Regulation
2632/70, 2970 O.J. (L 279) 35 (pertaining to radios and televisions); and Council Regula-
tion 964/71, 1971 O.J. (L 104) 12 (pertaining to textiles). See generally, Est M. Sinan,
European Community Customs Duties A Significant Trading Consideration for the U.S.
Companies, 18 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 401 (1992) (discussing the European Community's
customs duty system). The Caribbean Community ("CARICOM") also uses a substan-
tial transformation text. See Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973,
12 I.L.M. 1033 (1973) (entered into force Aug. 1, 1972).
56. See Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 560-62 (1908)
(holding that substantial transformation occurs where a product emerges with "a distinc-
tive name, character, or use" (citation omitted)); see also Torrington Co. v. United States,
764 F.2d 1563, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that "substantial transformation occurs
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designation or identity," the "fundamental character," or the "commer-
cial use" of a product.5 7 The test may also look to a change in the "form,
appearance, nature, or character of an article which adds to the value of
the article an amount or percentage which is significant in comparison to
the value which the article had when exported from the country in which
it was first manufactured, produced, or grown.""
A United States Customs Service ruling, for example, addressed
whether a Canadian steel slab had been substantially transformed
through being hot rolled into steel plate and heat treated in Belgium.59
On the one hand, if the steel slabs that traveled from Belgium to the
United States were Belgian, they would be subject to a Belgian voluntary
restraint agreement.' On the other hand, if they were Canadian, they
would qualify for preferential treatment under the CFTA.61 According
to the Customs Service the Belgian heat process resulted in "substantial
metallurgical changes," and, therefore, a substantial transformation.62
The Customs Service believed that the fact that more than 50 percent of
the final resale price of the steel plates was attributable to the initial value
of the Canadian slab was not determinative.63 It noted, further, that sub-
stantial transformation could occur even when processing constitutes
only 15 percent of the value added.' Thus, the range of factors and the
complexity of modem production processes render the substantial trans-
formation test unworkable.65
2. The Harmonized System
In response to the substantial transformation difficulties, many coun-
tries have chosen to determine product origin according to changes in
Harmonized System tariff classification.66 The Harmonized System elim-
inates much of the subjectivity from country of origin determinations by
when an article emerges from a manufacturing process with a name, character or use
which differs from the original material subject to the process" (citation omitted)).
57. See 19 C.F.R. 12.130(d)(1) (1992); see also 1993 WL 274541, *2 (Customs).
58. United States v. Murray, 621 F.2d 1163, 1169 (1st Cir. 1980); see also Torrington
Co., 764 F.2d at 1567-68.
59. See 1992 WL 252940 (Customs) (Mar. 30, 1992); see also, e.g., 1992 WL 440471,
*2 (Customs) (Mar. 24, 1992).
60. See 1992 WL 252940, at *2.
61. See id. at *3.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at *2 (citing HQ 081659).
65. See generally Book Review, 21 J. World Trade L. 98 (1987) (discussing Standardi-
zation of Rules of Origin, U.S. International Trade Commission).
66. See C. Edward Galfand, Heeding the Call For A Predictable Rule of Origin, I 1 U.
Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 469, 489-90 (1989).
Not only is the Harmonized System better than the rule of substantial transformation,
but it is better than the prior system of tariff classifications of the United States-the
Tariff Schedules of the United States. The Harmonized Schedule "limits the discretion-
ary interpretation power of United States authorities." See Schmidt & Jansen, supra note
4, at 133.
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ruling that a good is the product of the nation where it last underwent a
change in classification.67 The Harmonized System of classification is
highly specific and products are relatively easily classified. Although
trade lawyers still dispute the category under which a given good falls,
the test is infinitely more predictable than the rule of substantial
transformation.68
For example, the Customs Service easily determined that "cotton-
wrapped, rubber-core" yarn should enter into the United States from
Canada duty-free. 69 The yarn had earlier been produced in the United
States. The rubber had been produced in Malaysia. The Customs Ser-
vice had to determine whether weaving these components in Canada re-
sulted in a Canadian product for purposes of the CFA.70 The Customs
Service noted that, for purposes of the agreement, only foreign-originat-
ing materials needed to undergo a change in tariff classification to claim
duty-free treatment.71 Thus, because the Malaysian rubber cord changed
tariff classifications in transforming from its "unaltered state" 2 to being
"gimped" with cotton, the product qualified for duty-free treatment. 3
The other important benefit of using the Harmonized System is the
global familiarity with the system. GATT members uniformly use the
Harmonized System in many origin contexts.74 They have a working
understanding of the system.75 Using this system allows each country to
predict customs determinations abroad. Thus, the familiarity with the
Harmonized System facilitates investment.76
3. Value-Added Requirements
Many rules of origin, including those of both the CFTA and NAFTA
automobile rules of origin, however, attach value-added requirements to
the general system of tariff classification requirements. Although the
Uruguay Round of GATT will disallow value-added rules in non-prefer-
ential trade contexts, it will not affect value-added rules in preferential
contexts.7 7 In contrast to the Harmonized System, value-added require-
ments cloud country of origin determinations.
Judges and commentators have widely criticized value-added require-
ments.7 1 Under the value-added definitions, it is nearly impossible to de-
67. See Galfand, supra note 66, at 490.
68. See id
69. See HQ 952802, 1993 WL 274541 (Customs)( RE: country of origin and Canada
Free Trade Agreement eligibility of cotton-wrapped, rubber core yarns made in Canada).







77. See infra Part I.C.
78. See eg. Developments in Rules of Origin, supra note 24, at 292 (comment of
John Simpson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Regulatory, Tariff and
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termine whether costs are properly allocable to a given product. 79 The
value-added requirements must be better defined to avoid these troubles.
GATT may provide valuable means to achieve this end.
C. GAT World Trade Organization as a Forum to Reconcile NAFTA
Rules of Origin with GATT Principles
GATT's forthcoming World Trade Organization"0 would prohibit the
use of non-preferential rules of origin-those outside of free trade agree-
ments-to create non-tariff barriers81 to trade.82 According to the WTO,
non-preferential rules of origin must be administered in a "consistent,
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner." 3 In addition, they may not
be "used to influence trade or to create distortions or restrictions of
trade."84 The WTO would disallow value-added tests in non-preferential
contexts because they cause such distortions.8 5
Although the guidelines do not yet apply within free trade agree-
Trade Enforcement) ("Virtually all the problems, and absolutely all the serious problems,
come with the value-added change.").
79. See infra Part II.A (discussing the difficulties of value added determinations
within the CFTA).
80. Under the Uruguay round of GATT, the WTO replaces the Bretton Woods trad-
ing system. See Uruguay GATT, supra note 25, D. 1-14 art. 4(1) (discussing the difficul-
ties of value added determination within the CFTA).
81. Non-tariff barriers to trade include restrictive customs inspection and valuation
rules, quotas, licensing requirement, and technical barriers. The United States consist-
ently has pursued multilateral negotiations to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers since
the Kennedy Round in the mid-1960's. See generally A. Paul Victor, Trade Relief Laws
and Other Trade-Related Measures Most Likely to Impact on Transborder Transactions,
in International Commercial Agreements 1993, at 693 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course
Handbook Series, 1993); see also Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competi-
tion, Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34 Harv. Int'l L.J. 47 (1993) (discussing GATT's
focus on eliminating both Tariff and non-tariff barriers).
One of the benefits of a free trade area over general GATT treatment is that GATT has
failed adequately to address non-tariff barriers. See Joseph L. Brand, The New World
Order of Regional Trading Blocks, 8 Am. U. J. Int'l L & Pol'y 155 (1992). The free trade
area allows parties to combat non-tariff barriers in a more narrow context. See id.
According to a recent study, non-tariff barriers are the most frequent subject of GATT
complaints. See Robert E. Hudec et al., A Statistical Profile of GA TT Dispute Settlement
Cases: 1948-1989, 2 Minn. J. of Global Trade 1 (1993). For the entire 42 years of GATT
existence, non-tariff barriers have been the subject of 52 percent of all complaints. See Id.
These were followed by tariffs, subsidies, and antidumping and countervailing duty meas-
ures. See id. Moreover, tariffs have declined over time and non-tariff barriers have be-
come much more important. See id.; see generally Steinberg, supra note 2, at 323
("Perhaps the most pervasive means of exacerbating trade diversion in recent years has
been the calculated manipulation of a region's rules of origin.").
82. See President Clinton's Submission to Congress of Documents Concerning Uru-
guay Round Agreement, Dec. 15, 1993, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), Dec. 17, 1993,
at M241. The agreement only applies to rules of origin "other than rules of origin relat-
ing to the granting of tariff preferences." Id.
83. Id.; see also International Trade: Uruguay Round Ends in Geneva; Major Provi-
sions of Deal Outlined, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), Dec. 16, 1993, at C240.
84. Id.
85. See id.
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ments,"6 the GATT parties may agree to implement them."7 GATT pro-
vides means for the parties to do so.8" For example, it provides for a
Rule of Origin Committee to recommend policies for the GATT parties
to adopt.89
United States trade representatives should use GATT to reform the
guidelines for preferential rules of origin. United States officials endorsed
these guidelines to combat the European Community's rules of origin.90
The United States could now both reform its own rules of origin and
obtain greater access to the European Community.91 GATT allows such
a change through providing that its members may by joint action accept
an "understanding" that prohibits the misuse of rules of origin in prefer-
ential contexts.9
2
In sum, to prevent discordant applications of rules of origin and to
ensure a stable investment climate, NAFTA member states must care-
fully define their value measuring terms. The value-added component
that the member states have chosen requires consistent application.
Guidelines will facilitate origin determinations, and will ease interna-
tional trade and political relations.
II. United States Customs Service Interpretations of the CFTA-s Rules
of Origin
Under the CFTA, the United States Customs Service construed the
rules of origin to prevent the duty-free entry of several automobile mod-
els from Canada.93 Canadian officials were outraged,94 and brought their
86. See id.
87. See Uruguay GATT, supra note 25, XXIV:4.
Cabining the restrictive provisions to non-preferential rules of origin does not mean
that rules of origin may be used for any purpose whatsoever. Uruguay GATT art.
XXIV:4 stipulates that the parties should not create free-trade areas "to raise barriers to
trade of other contracting parties with the [free-trade area member] territories." Uru-
guay GATT art. XXIV:4. However, the use of the word "should," as opposed to "must"
or "shall" suggests that this provision would provide no basis to question a free-trade
area. Cf Steinberg, supra note 2, at 339 (discussing GATTs guidelines with regard to
non-tariff barriers in the free trade area context). Moreover, to establish that a free-trade
agreement was designed to raise barriers presents more of a burden then to establish that
it has these effects. Free-trade area members could proffer a host of other reasons justify-
ing their reasons for building of the free-trade area.
88. See generally Steinberg, supra note 2, at 340 (discussing all of the potential GATT
mechanisms to achieve a ban on misuse of rules of origin in preferential trade contexts).
89. See id.
90. See infra Part III.B.l.
91. See id.
92. See Uruguay GATT, supra note 25, art. XXVI:I. This states in relevant part,
"Representatives of the contracting parties shall meet from time to time for the purpose
of giving effect to those provisions of [the] Agreement which involve joint action and,
generally, with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of the
Agreement." Uruguay GAT, supra note 25, art. XXV:1. This type of action is usually
taken in the monthly GATT Council meetings or annual Contracting Parties' Sessions.
See Steinberg, supra note 2, at 352.
93. For a discussion of the issues of G.M-Suzuki, see In the Matter of Article 304,
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concerns to a binational dispute resolution panel. 95 The panel found, in
G.M. Suzuki 6, that the Customs Service had misapplied the value-added
rules.
This Part explains the problems with the Customs Service's interpreta-
tions of the CFTA's rules of origin. It also addresses the ramifications of
these Customs Service interpretations of the rules of origin. The conse-
quences of the misinterpretation of the rules of origin under CFTA will
be replicated under NAFTA if the rules of origin are not improved.
A. CFTA Rules of Origin
Under the CFTA, a good traveled duty-free between the United States
and Canada if it met one of several tests.97 The test that applied to
automobiles not wholly obtained or produced within the free trade area,
i.e., goods containing third-country components (so-called "hybrid
goods") contained both a change in tariff classification component and a
value added component.9"
Hybrid automobiles or parts only travelled duty-free between the
member states if processing or assembly within the states had resulted in
the requisite change of tariff classification.99 The member states assessed
CFTA changes in tariff classifications according to rules corresponding
supra note 21, at 1. Rulings pertaining to Honda include: U.S. Customs Memorandum
089427, at 3 (Dec. 9, 1991); Memorandum HQ 000160 (Feb. 27, 1992) (internal Customs
Service Memorandum); Memorandum HQ 000164 (Apr.30, 1992) (internal Customs Ser-
vice Memorandum).
94. See infra Part II.B.
95. See id.
96. See In the Matter of Article 304, supra note 21, at 1.
97. The Rules of Origin of the CFTA read in pertinent part:
For the purposes of implementing the tariff treatment contemplated under the
Agreement, goods originate in the territory of a Party if-
(A) they are wholly obtained or produced in the territory of either Party
or both Parties; or
(B) they ... have been transformed in the territory of either Party or
both Parties so as to be subject to a change in tariff classification as de-
scribed in the Annex rules or to such other requirements as the Annex
rules may provide when no change in tariff classifications occurs ....
CFTA art. 301.
There are a total of three tests. The first applies to agriculture products or products
such as minerals that originate from within the free trade area. The second applies when
there has been a change in classification. Within this category, goods may also be re-
quired to pass a value added test. The third test applies where there has not been a
change in classification because of technical reasons, but enough value has been added
that the agreement still accords the good preferential treatment. See generally, Shelly P.
Battram & Blake Murray, The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement and North
American Automotive Production, in The U.S./Canada Trade Agreement, at 37 (PLI
Comm. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 494, 1989) (discussing generally the
CFTA rules of origin that apply to automobiles).
98. See Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 377-78.
99. See generally supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the Harmonized System rule of origin
test).
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to the Harmonized System."oo
With regard to Harmonized System classification under the CFTA,
transforming a good from one chapter to another was sufficient to allow
duty-free treatment under the CFTA, but changing it from one heading
within a chapter to another heading within the same chapter was insuffi-
cient."' 1 For example, similar to the NAFTA ketchup scenario,"° 2 for-
eign cotton yarn could not acquire duty-free treatment through being
woven into rope.10 3 Both cotton yarn and rope were of the same chap-
ter."° Automobiles and parts also had to change chapters to satisfy a
change in Harmonized System classification. 0 5
In addition to the change of classification, however, automobiles and
parts also had to meet a value-added test."0 6 Under the CFTA, both cars
and car components were required to contain 50 percent of originating"07
value.108 Thus, even if a hybrid car changed tariff classifications in the
free trade area, it was required to meet the value-added threshold to
qualify for CFrA preferential treatment.
Interestingly, if a component originated from within the free trade
area, the CFTA deemed the entirety of the component's value to origi-
nate within the free trade area in determining the origin of a car into
which the component was incorporated. This was so even where the
component contained a significant amount of foreign material. This was
the so-called roll-up rule. Similarly, a component was considered to have
zero originating value, "even if it contain[ed] substantial American or
Canadian ingredients-[the] so-called roll-down [rule].""' 9
The value-added component of the CFTA rules of origin for
automobiles led to two prominent controversies-the G.M.-Suzuki" °
and Honda". disputes.
100. See id.
101. See Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 379.
102. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
103. See HQ 952802, RE: Classification, country of origin and Canada Free Trade
Agreement eligibility of cotton-wrapped, rubber core yarns made in Canada; subheading
5604.10.0000, HTSUSA, 1993 WL 274541 (Customs).
104. See id.
105. See CFTA art. 304 and annex 301, para. 2.
106. See id.
There are three methods which most nations use in determining a good's origin: (1) the
rule of substantial transformation; (2) the change of tariff heading rule, and (3) the value
added test. See Ralph H. Sheppard, Esq., NAFTA Rules of Origin from the Importer's
Perspective: What the Agreement Should Contain, 1 Mexico Trade L. Rep. 20 (1991).
Traditionally, the United States has relied on the rule of substantial transformation.
Under this rule, a product originates within the exporting country if "a new and different
article of commerce emerges, having a distinctive name, character and use." Id. See
generally Part I.B.1 (discussing the problems of the rule of substantial transformation).
107. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
108. See CFTA art. 301.
109. Id.
110. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
111. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
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1. CFTA Chapter XVIII Dispute Resolution Panel Decision
in G.M.-Suzuki
G.M.-Suzuki 12 was a controversy involving General Motors and the
Suzuki Motor Corporation, joint venturers in an Ontario Cami plant.
The member states had to decide whether to include as North American
a cost that was neither expressly included nor expressly excluded in the
definition of "direct cost of processing or direct cost of assembling.""' 3
The parties debated whether non-mortgage interest should be included
within CFTA originating value." 4 Canadian authorities allowed the
value, because the value was attributable to the production of the
goods. '5 The United States Customs Service, to the contrary, disal-
lowed non-mortgage interest.' 6 According to Customs Service officials,
the value was not attributable to the production of the goods." 7 A
CFTA Chapter Eighteen dispute resolution panel resolved the dispute,
finding that non-mortgage interest should be included in originating
value. " 8 The most important aspect of the decision was the panel's ap-
proach to the controversy, however.
The panel looked for the purpose of the distinction between the in-
cluded and the excluded costs and found that the purpose was to distin-
guish direct costs of manufacture from general expenses. 19 The member
states wanted to reward those who produced in the free trade area, but
only those producers. Toward that purpose, the panel recommended
that interest costs of machinery were direct costs and should be included
in the North American content.' 20 The panel found that interest on ma-
chinery is as central to the value of a good as mortgage interest. 12
2. Honda' 22 Brouhaha:'23 The Transplant Controversy
Honda initially entered the American market by manufacturing a sub-
compact three-door Civic in Ontario, Canada. Although the Civics were
completed in Canada, their engines were made in Ohio using United
States aluminum ingot and cast iron cylinder sleeves, and several Japa-
112. In the Matter of Article 304, supra note 21, at 1.
113. See Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 381.
114. See In the Matter of Article 304, supra note 21, at 1.
115. See Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 184.
116. See id.
117. Seeid.
118. See In the Matter of Article 304, supra note 21, at 1.
119. Id.
120. See id. The parties accepted this recommendation and closed the GM-Suzuki
case. See id.
121. Id.
122. "Of all Japanese auto companies, Honda has operated in the U.S. for the longest
and claims the highest U.S. content. It is a pioneer, and thus has emerged as a potent
symbol of this debate." Paul Magnusson, Honda: Is it an American Car?, Bus. Week,
Nov. 18, 1991, at 105.
123. See ITC Rules of Origin Study, 1 Mexico Trade & L. Rep., No. 2, Nov. 1, 1991
(coining the term "Honda brouhaha").
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nese parts.124
Honda of Canada qualified the United States manufactured Civic en-
gines for duty-free shipment from the United States to Canada. 25 The
Customs and Excise branch of Revenue Canada held that the United
States engine contained sufficient North American value to qualify as
originating. 126 It found that the North American value content of the
Ohio engines was approximately 66 percent.' 27 Because the percentage
of value required for duty-free treatment was 50 percent, 28 the agency
qualified the engines for duty-free treatment. 129
Honda of Canada incorporated these engines into Civics, along with
other North American and non-North American components. Honda
then claimed that the shipment of the Canadian Civics to the United
States satisfied the 50 percent value threshold for duty-free shipment by
virtue of the North American value of the engines and other parts. They
reasoned that because the engines originated in North America, their en-
tire value would be North American in calculating the value distribution
of the Canadian automobile. Although a hybrid good contains signifi-
cant value from third countries, if it originates within the free trade area
it travels duty-free and all of the good's value is considered to be North
American. 3 Regardless, the United States disallowed the North Ameri-
can value content of the engines.' 3 '
124. See Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 380.
125. See Revenue Canada, Customs & Excise No. 4568-6-5/Honda(engine) (BP) (Feb.
27, 1992).
126. See id Over ninety percent of the seventy-one thousand engines qualified. See id.
127. See Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 381. The agency did not officially re-
lease the figures. See id.
128. See supra notes 97-109 for discussion of CFTA rules of origin for automobiles.
129. See Revenue Canada, Customs and Excise No. 4568-6-5/Honda(engine)
(BP)(Feb. 27, 1992).
130. See CFTA art. 301. The role up rule, in essence, embodies the concept that a
good "originating" from the territory of the member states for purposes of the treaty need
not contain only value from within the free trade area. So long as the good has under-
gone the requisite change in tariff classification and value added requirements, the good
will be considered originating and all of its value will be considered originating. See supra
note 109 and accompanying text (discussing roll-up and roll-down rules).
131. Anti-dumping issues and US contempt for the Japanese keiretsu method of busi-
ness dealing also clouded this Honda controversy. "The Internal Revenue Service has
beefed up its scrutiny of transfer pricing behavior by Japanese companies. The Justice
[Department] is reviewing its guidelines on whether the vertically integrated Japanese
auto keiretsu violate U.S. antitrust laws.... All of a sudden the issues of cars and
transplants and keiretsu are coalescing into one." Magnusson, supra note 122, at 105
(quotations omitted). See Bill Being Drafted on Japan's Treatment of U.S. Autos, Nat'l J.
Congress Daily, Oct. 15, 1991. "The auditors said Honda offiered cars for sale to consum-
ers in the United States at less than the cost of manufacture, as computed by the Customs
Service." Robert Pear, U.S. Says Honda Skirted Customs Fees, N.Y. Times, June 17,
1991, at DI.
While United States officials have disallowed the American content of Canadian
automobiles, they simultaneously have tried to convince Europeans that the Honda Ac-
cords made in Ohio are American and should not count against European Community
quotas on Japanese imports. See Magnusson, supra note 122, at 105.
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Ironically, the Customs Service found that the engines did not origi-
nate in the United States for purposes of the CFTA. 32 As a result, pur-
suant to the roll-down rule, 133 the Customs Service considered the
engines to be entirely non-originating and to be devoid of North Ameri-
can value. 134 Consequently, the Civics had less than 46 percent of overall
North American content. 35 Customs then billed Honda for $17 million
retroactively, representing a 2.5 percent tariff on Civics shipped between
January 1, 1989,136 the effective date of the CFTA, and March 1,
1990.137 More important than the economic effect on Honda, however,
are the decision's serious political repercussions. 13
The technical underpinnings for the Customs Service decision deserve
brief consideration. First, the Customs Service held that since there was
no change in tariff classification from the transformation of the engine
subcomponents into the engine, the rule applicable to situations in which
there was no change in tariff classification should apply.'3 9 Application
132. Customs auditors found only $51.75 worth of U.S. parts and raw materials in the
Honda engines made in Ohio, and found that more than $700 came from suppliers in
Japan or transplant parts makers, wholly or partially owned by Honda. See id.
133. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
134. See Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 381. "Customs regarded the engines
sent from Ohio to Ontario as not meeting the 50 percent requirement and, under the roll-
down rule, Customs therefore treated the engines as having zero North American con-
tent." Id.
135. See id. at 382. According to customs auditors, the roll-up rule allows vertically
integrated companies such as Honda to manipulate the value calculation process. See
Magnusson, supra note 122, at 105. According to one auditor, "it is possible, with some
extraordinary planning, to have a car with less than 50 percent North American content
become 100 percent North American on paper." Id.
Honda certified that $3,350 worth of materials came from North America, but the
Customs Service said $1,085 of this amount represented 'foreign costs.' Customs con-
cluded that at least 62 percent of the materials used to produce the Civics-$3,760 of a
total of $6,025-originated outside North America. See Pear, supra note 131, at D1.
According to Honda's own accounting, the biggest item of local content added in the
engine plant was the depreciation of the factory's equipment. See Magnusson, supra note
122, at 105. Customs charged that most of this should not have been included because it
was imported from Japan. See id. "[I]n capital-intensive auto manufacturing, to what
country do auditors attribute the value added by machinery, especially if the machinery is
from Japan?" Id.
136. See Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 380.
137. Id. at 381.
138. See id. at 383.
[D]ecisions about ... which general expenses are "reasonably allocable" to pro-
duction depend on how the decision maker views the object of the inquiry. If
the object is to make sure no one 'gets away with anything,' the burden of per-
suasion will be on the manufacturer trying to qualify for duty-free treatment; if,
on the other hand, the object of the inquiry is to smooth the way for free trade
between the treaty partners, the same data, viewed against an incomplete or
ambiguous text, may well lead to a different result.
Id.
139. The agreement treats some goods as originating where a tariff change has not
occurred, but uses a more stringent value definition than otherwise applicable. See
CFTA "[G]oods ... shall be considered... as goods originating in the territory of the
Party if... the value of materials originating in the territory... plus the direct cost of
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of this rule resulted in a finding that only the direct costs of assembly in
the United States would be included; the Customs Service excluded di-
rect costs of processing.11°
In coming to this conclusion, however, the Customs Service applied
the wrong rule.'41 There had, in fact, been a change in tariff classifica-
tion. 14 2 Therefore, Customs should have applied the rule allowing
processing costs, rather than the rule restricted to assembly costs.
Second, the Customs Service held that even under the test for goods in
which there is a change in classification, the costs "reasonably allocated
to the production of goods" do not include costs from the casting and
machining of the engine components.' 43 According to Customs, costs
may be reasonably allocated only if they result directly from the produc-
tion of goods.44 However, since the definitions section to the rule indi-
cates that "the cost of energy, fuel, dies, molds, [and] tooling" should be
reasonably allocated to the costs of production, "casting and machining"
costs should be included. 145
Finally, the Customs Service held that "the costs directly incurred, or
that can reasonably be allocated to, the production of goods '146 would
not include any costs that were not direct costs.' 47 Thus, any costs
claimed by Honda that the Customs Service did not consider to be direct
costs could not be allocated to the production of the engines.' 48 Honda
had argued, to the contrary, that in addition to direct costs, other costs
should be included if they were reasonably allocated to the production of
goods. 149
From the perspective of the panel decision in G.M-Suzuki, Honda's
view is correct.' 5 ' The costs of assembling the engine should be included
assembling the goods.. .constitute[s] not less than 50 percent of the value of the goods
when exported .. " Id. (emphasis added).
Where there is a change to heading 8407 from any other heading, direct costs of
processing should be included in addition to direct costs of assembling. See CFTA ch.
XVI, para. 3; See also CFTA ch. III, rules annex. These include costs of labor, inspec-
tion, energy, engineering, rent, and royalties. See id
140. See U.S. Customs Service, Memorandum HQ 000160 (Feb. 27, 1992).
141. Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 381.
142. The transformation was from the head and block, 8409.91 of the Harmonized
System, to engine, 8407.34 of the Harmonized System. Id.
143. U.S. Customs Memorandum 089427, at 3 (Dec. 9, 1991); U.S. Customs Service,
Memorandum HQ 000164 (Apr. 30, 1992).
144. See id.
145. According to the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 'tool-
ing' means "[w]ork or ornamentation done with tools." 'Machining' means "[tlo cut,
shape, or finish by machine." Machining obviously is merely a specific form of tooling.
146. HQ 000160, Feb. 27, 1992.
147. Direct costs include all costs that are incorporated directly into the thing manu-
factured. Indirect costs, to the contrary, are costs not part of the production of goods.
These latter costs would, for instance, include administrative expenses.
148. Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 382.
149. See ia
150. See supra Part II.A.1.
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because they are intrinsically related to the production of the goods.
They are not indirectly related, for example, like office space overhead.
Thus, the Customs Service in the Honda decision misjudged the divid-
ing line between included and excluded costs. Inclusion should turn on
the composition of the product, not on the phraseology of specifically
included or excluded items.
B. Extreme Ramifications of Unguided Value-Added Determinations
The consequences of the Honda controversy spread far beyond the
parties directly involved.15 1 The controversy thwarted foreign invest-
ment and enraged Canadian trade representatives. 1
52
As a result of the decision, foreign investors were less likely to devote
their resources to development in the free trade area. Investors found the
rules of origin to be unpredictable and to create an unstable investment
climate.153 Indeed, the Treasury Department never issued regulations on
value content measurement. 154 Because the rules of origin were framed
as general principles, producers' reliance on them would have required
systematic prior elaboration. Moreover, complying with a Customs Ser-
vice audit incurred excessive expenses.' 55 In the Honda case, for exam-
ple, the United States audit involved more than one hundred Honda
employees who spent eleven thousand hours providing information and
meeting with Customs Service officials.' 56
In addition, the Canadian trade officials became outraged.' 57 They
feared that if third-country manufacturers could not benefit from the
CFTA when assembly operations were in Canada, the manufacturers
would relocate their operations to the United States.' 58 Commentators
have captured the essence of the controversy in posing the following rhe-
torical questions: "Did the United States want to collect the 2.5 percent
duty on Hondas coming from Canada... ? Or did it want to encourage
assembly operations in the United States rather than in Canada?"'5 9 In
response to the Honda decision, Canada even invoked Chapter Eighteen
of the CFTA to appeal the decision to a dispute resolution panel,' 60
151. See supra Part II.C.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See Magnusson, supra note 122, at 105.
155. The Canadian audits were more speedy and professional. See id.
156. See U.S. Customs Audit Biased, Honda says, Toronto Star, Oct. 16, 1991, at D5
(Reuters byline).
157. See Cantin & Lowenfeld supra note 3, at 385.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. See Bernard Simon, Canada Seeks End to Car Content Dispute, Fin. Times, Jan.
8, 1992, at 13; Canada Requests FTA Dispute Panel on Treatment of Non-mortgage Inter-
est, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 67, Jan. 8, 1992. One of the subissues to the dispute was
whether regional content should include non-mortgage interest. See id. The United
States Customs took the position that only interest related to a mortgage can be included
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although the panel never convened. 161
The value-added difficulties of the Honda controversy reduced the de-
sirability of the CFTA as an option for importers. 62 Since fostering im-
porters' antipathy toward the agreement would contravene the
agreement's goals and would thwart the development of economies of
scale, NAFTA's success largely will depend on whether it has improved
the rules to foster investment in the free trade area.
III. NAFTA's RULES OF ORIGIN FOR AUTOMOBILES
Partly to resolve the Honda dispute, the United States and Canada
agreed to clarify NAFTA's rules of origin and to resolve the existing
disputes according to the new rules. 63 NAFTA has alleviated some of
CFTA's difficulties.'
Hybrid automobile and automobiles parts must qualify under Article
401(b) to receive duty-free treatment.165 Under this article, goods also
must meet a change in tariff classification test and a minimum threshold
percentage of regional value content, although the details are somewhat
different from those of the CFTA. 6 6 The Honda scenario must be
under the rules of origin. See id The Canadian officials also included interest paid in
relation to land, equipment, and buildings used in the production of goods. See id.
Under the CFTA, the parties would have 30 days from the date of the formal request
to form the panel that would be composed of two members of each country and a fifth
chosen jointly. The panel would then have 120 days to issue a final report.
161. Commentators thought that if the Honda controversy would have gone to the
panel, that a resolution favorable to Honda would have resulted. See Cantin &
Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 385.
162. See Sheppard, supra note 106; Implementation of the U.&-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, U.S. General Accounting Office, at 28-31 (GAO/GGD-93-21, 1992). In ad-
dition, whereas Revenue Canada had moderated the impact of a strict accounting ap-
proach by adopting a Generally Accepted Accounting Principle approach, the United
States took a narrower view. See Ralph H. Sheppard, supra note 106. The barriers posed
by these accounting requirements may be insurmountable.
163. Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 385.
164. There are a total of four alternative standards under NAFTA. First, NAFTA
allows duty free treatment for a good wholly produced in the territory of the parties. See
NAFTA art. 401(a). This category largely refers to agricultural, livestock, and mineral
products. See NAFTA art. 415(a)-(j). Second, the Agreement allows duty free treat-
ment for a good that undergoes a change in tariff classification according to the Harmo-
nized System. See NAFTA arts. 401(b), 413(a). With regard to automobiles, the
additional regional value content (RVC) minimum threshold percentage requirements of
art. 403 generally must be met within this category. Third, if unassembled components of
a good do not undergo a change in tariff classification because the component parts and
the finished product are classified in the same category, the good may qualify for duty
free treatment if the value of originating materials plus the direct costs of assembly meet
the stated value-content requirement. See NAFTA art. 401(d). Each of these preceding
methods also existed under the CFTA. NAFTA adds a fourth 'de minimis' test which
allows duty-free treatment if a good contains no more than 7 percent 'non originating'
material. See NAFTA art. 405. The CFTA had been criticized for disallowing qualifica-
tion where an importer product had minimal third country content, but no change in
classification. See Sheppard, supra note 106, at 20.
165. See id
166. See NAFTA arts. 403, 402(5)(d)(i), 402(5)(d)(ii), 402(5)(a), 402(5)(c). Auto-
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reevaluated under the new provisions.
A. NAFTA'S Reformation of the CFTA's Value-Added Component to
the Automobile Rules of Origin
One controversial aspect of the CFTA automotive provisions related
to the type of value that should be considered in calculating the value-
added requirement.' 67 NAFTA adopted a broader view of this require-
ment than the CFTA, 16 s defining "production" as "growing, mining,
harvesting, fishing, trapping, hunting, manufacturing, processing or as-
sembling a good."' 69 The inclusion of manufacturing, processing, or as-
sembling within the "production" definition avoids the Honda-type
controversy over what types of costs should be considered. The broader
definition is a great improvement over the hair-splitting CFTA
provisions. 1 70
NAFTA also increased the value-added requirement of the rules of
origin for automobiles. 7 ' Workers and, therefore, congressional repre-
sentatives have been concerned about protecting North American em-
ployment opportunities in automotive parts production. 172  The
agreement, therefore, endeavors to encourage foreign companies to im-
port fewer parts and to produce more parts in North American facili-
ties. 173 The value-added requirements have been increased to prevent
non-NAFTA producers from using Mexico as a "platform" from which
to ship their goods to the territory of the other members duty-free. 74
The threshold of 62.5 percent 75 was a compromise. During the
mobiles must be assessed according to the net cost valuation method. This method in-
cludes most direct costs incurred in a member country. This is similar to the CFTA
valuation method. However, NAF1TA allows more direct costs and alleviates the distinc-
tions between assembly costs and processing costs, and between 'direct' and 'reasonably
allocated' costs. See Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 386-88.
167. See supra Part II.
168. The resolution of the issue of what type of costs would be included North Ameri-
can value from the finishing of the engine Civic in Ohio, in the Honda dispute, would be
favorable to Honda.
169. NAFTA art. 415.
170. See supra Part II.A.
171. Under the CFTA rules of origin, a car or component required, in addition to a
change in tariff classification, 50 percent value added in one party before it could travel
duty-free to the other. By 2002, NAFrA will have increased the percentage of value
required to be added in North America to 62.5 percent.
172. Everett, supra note 17, at 1E.
173. See id. In the long run, Mexico may lose some parts production jobs to United
States and Canadian competitors. Under NAFTA, Mexico must abandon the rules
which it currently maintains that require foreign producers of automobiles in Mexico to
use Mexican parts. Once NAFTA is implemented, producers of cars in Mexico may also
use parts from Canada and the United States. See id.
174. See id. "[R]ules that require greater use of North American-made parts in any
vehicle traded duty-free among the three countries ... should limit Japanese imports and
also could protect jobs in the huge U.S. auto parts industry." Id.
175. The increases will occur in two steps over an eight year period. From January 1,
1994 through the January 1, 1998, the percentage will remain at 50 percent. See NAFTA
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NAFTA negotiations, American manufacturers sought a high regional
value content to protect their competition from non-NAFTA vehicles. 6
Canada accepted the increase in exchange for a more inclusive value defi-
nition.177 Mexico had wanted a lower threshold to encourage investment
in Mexico by non-NAFTA automobile companies who could sell their
products duty-free in the United States or Canada.' The increased
value-added threshold has the greatest potential to thwart investment in
the free trade area. It has engendered more cries of protectionism than
any other aspect of the rules of origin for automobiles. 79
To prevent the increased value threshold from diverting investment,
the rules should be interpreted consistently. In the end, it is not clear
whether the increase in the percent of North American value required
will encourage or discourage Japanese investment in NAFTA. '' If read
consistently, the rules of origin may become the decisive factor in favor
of investment.
To benefit producers in Honda's position, NAFTA also abandoned the
CFTA's roll-up/roll-down rule in the Auto Sector provisions.' 8 ' In
art. 403(5)(a). The percentage will then be 56 percent for motor vehicles and some parts,
including engines, until January 1, 2002, when it rises to 62.5 percent. NAFTA art.
403(5)(a).
Some commentators have noted that initially, auto producers will get a big break with
regard to the rules of origin. Under the first four years, the percentage of value required
to be added in North America will remain at 50 percent, but will include costs that were
not allowable under the CFTA. See Eric Hartman, The Northeast-Midwest Congressional
Institute Press Briefing, Fed. News, Dec. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
CRNWS File.
176. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report On the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement 10, Oct. 28, 1993 [hereinafter "Bar Report"]. Japanese com-
panies and their transplant operations in North America seem to be the principal target
of the more protectionist Domestic Content standards. See id. See also Hearing on
NAFTA and the Public Sector (Rep. Conyers) (July 27, 1993). "[At a 62.5 percent value
requirement], Japanese auto companies would be allowed to use Mexico and Canada as
platforms to achieve further penetration of the United States market. Cars assembled in
Mexico and Canada by Japanese and other auto manufacturers would be allowed to enter
the United States duty free, even if a substantial portion of the parts in those vehicles are
imported form outside of North Americas." Id.
177. See Kelly McParland, Election Result Could Hit Trade Deals, Fin. Post, Sept. 2,
1993, at 7; see also supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing the more inclusive
value definition).
178. See Bar Report, supra note 76, at 10. Mexico must significantly modify its Auto
Decree to participate in NAFIA. See NAFTA app. 300-A.2. For example, Mexico
must change the conditions required to qualify as a national supplier of autoparts or an
enterprise of the autoparts industry. See id Also, Mexico must phase out its value-added
rules for the percentage of parts that must be purchased from national parts producers
and the rules requiring the level of export goods to meet the amount of goods imported
into Mexico. See id
179. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
180. Compare Damian Fraser, Survey of World Car Industry, Fin. Times, Sept. 9,
1993, at XI ("VW and Nissan are having to persuade German and Japanese parts suppli-
ers to set up in Mexico so as to comply."), with Taylor, supra note 17, at 23 (suggesting
the high North American content requirement would discourage relocation of Japanese
vehicle parts production).
181. See Bar Report, supra note 176, at 16.
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Honda, the Customs Service calculated the value-added to the engine in
the United States to be less than 50 percent, and rolled down the value of
the engine to zero in calculating the North American value of the Cana-
dian Civic.1"2 Even though the trade authorities determined that much
of each car's value was added in the United States, they gave the car no
credit for the engine's value. In contrast, under NAFTA's rules of origin
for automobiles, the value of materials considered nonoriginating is the
actual value of the materials, without any "rolling" effects.18 3 Thus, the
value of nonoriginating components that are incorporated into larger as-
semblies would be traced forward from the value at importation through
each subsequent value-added stage until NAFTA preference is
claimed.' 4 Thus, the value of a nonoriginating material always will be
deducted from the value of a sub-component. 5
These value definition and rolling changes will allow the disputed
Hondas to qualify for duty-free treatment. NAFTA's rules of origin ex-
pand the range of costs included under the net cost method of determina-
tion and would allow the value of the engine to surpass a 50 percent
North American value requirement. 6 The value of the engine attributa-
ble to North American value would be the actual amount of value incor-
porated within it." 7 "Th[e] product will be strictly accounted for as it
goes through the production process so that if an engine has only 50
percent North American content, that's all that it will be credited for
when included in a finished vehicle."'88 This adds enough value to the
46 percent North American engineless Civic to qualify the car for duty-
182. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text. In the Honda case, the role-down
aspect of the rule resulted in a zero value added determination for the United States
engine block. See id. If the role-down rule were not in effect, the North American value
added in the engine may have allowed the Civic to qualify for duty-free treatment in
shipment to the United States.
183. See NAFTA art. 403.
[T]he value of non-originating materials used by the producer in the production
of the good shall be the sum of the values of non-originating materials, deter-
mined [by transaction value if available] at the time the non-originating materi-
als are received by the first person in the territory of a Party who takes title to
them, that are imported from outside the territories of the Parties... and that
are used in the production of the good or that are used in the production of any
material used in the production of the good.
Id.
184. See Automotive Industries Will Gain in the Long Term, 3 Mexico Trade & L. Rep.
No. 7, July 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
185. Although commentators have suggested that the Ohio engine would be consid-
ered entirely North American under the agreement, see Lowenfeld & Cantin, supra note
3, at 388, this conclusion appears incorrect.
186. Although eventually, the value requirement for automobiles will be at sixty-two
and one-half percent, the Honda controversy is to be resolved under the terms of the
agreement as they initially apply.
187. There is no roll-up rule under the agreement. See supra note 183 and accompany-
ing text. Therefore, in no event would the engine be considered to be one hundred per-
cent North American.
188. Hartman, supra note 175, at *1.
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free treatment.8 9
B. Improvement
Because the actual percentage of value added in the territories of the
parties will be used in NAFTA value determinations, interpreting value-
added requirements consistently may be more important now than under
previous agreement. Under the CFTA, a general determination that a
component was either more or less than 50 percent originating was ade-
quate to assess whether the component had 100 percent or no North
American value. Under NAFTA, to the contrary, a precise determina-
tion must be made. To this end, it is as important now as ever for the
Customs Service to work with the officials of the other member states to
arrive at consistent interpretations of the rules of origin.
1. Preliminary Recourse: NAFTA's Working Groups
NAFTA provides for working groups to harmonize the interpretations
of rules of origin and to ensure that the interpretations are in accord with
the principles of the agreement. 90 The United States should comply
with NAFTA's mandate to participate in the groups.
The United States should not let NAFTA's rules of origin working
group mandates fall by the wayside, as did similar CFTA working
groups. The CFTA mandated the creation of a working group to resolve
antidumping disputes.' Yet, the United States refused to meet with
Canada to discuss the harmonization of anti-dumping policies.' 92 The
apparent acts of bad faith under the CFTA engendered significant Cana-
dian contempt and distrust. Similarly, for the United States indepen-
dently to interpret NAFTA would "be an error-filled chore rife with
interpretational disagreements respecting tariff classification"' 93 and
value-added determinations.' 94 It would be a mistake for the United
States to refuse to cooperate this time around.
NAFTA has established a working group on rules of origin.'"5 The
189. Most commentators believe that Honda will be relieved of the duties of the origi-
nal customs audit. See id.
190. NAFTA establishes a Working Group on Rules of Origin, comprising representa-
tives of each party to ensure the effective implementation of the rules of origin. See
NAFTA art. 513. The Working Group must meet at least four times per year and at the
request of any Party. Id The Customs Subgroup also must meet four times per year. Id.
The representatives of this group must "endeavor to agree" on "the uniform interpreta-
tion, application and administration" of the rules of origin. Id. Although the United
States had not complied with CFTA working groups, it would benefit from compliance
with NAFTA's institutions. See infra Part III.
191. See CFTA art. 1907, para. 1(b) (creating working group on antidumping duties).
192. Later, under the NAFTA, the United States insisted on dropping the provision
for the creation of the working group, to avoid the preexisting obligation.
193. Robert T. Givens & Rayburn Berry, Customs Enforcement and the NAFTA, 24
St. Mary's L.J. 903, 926-27 (1993).
194. See supra Part I.B.3.
195. See NAFTA art. 513.
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purpose of the group is to ensure the effective implementation of the rules
of origin. 19 6 It is designed to include representatives of each party and to
meet at least four times each year.197 In addition, NAFTA has estab-
lished a customs subgroup on rules of origin, the purpose of which is to
"endeavor to agree" on "the uniform interpretation, application and ad-
ministration" of the rules of origin.198
The United States should participate with the other member states to
agree on the proper application of the rules of origin. Under the CFTA,
the United States failed to put forth any clear guidelines for interpreta-
tion, correct or not.199 Moreover, in G.M.-Suzuki the Chapter Eighteen
dispute resolution panel achieved a better, more holistic, interpretation of
what type of value should be considered to be originating than had the
United States Customs Service.2" ° The United States should help to ar-
rive at a uniform understanding before it becomes necessary to employ
the dispute resolution panels to resolve particular controversies. Uni-
form understanding and interpretation will encourage the foreign invest-
ment envisioned by NAFTA and save traders the unnecessary and
prohibitive costs of litigating these issues.20' To these ends, the United
States should follow NAFTA's provisions for the working groups on
rules of origin.
2. GATT Committees
One remaining concern to the United States would be that without a
formal GATT prohibition of unfair preferential rules of origin, other free
trade groups, especially the European Community, might continue to use
origin rules unfairly to restrict the importation of NAFTA products.20 2
To avoid this result, the member states should pursue the GATT adop-
tion of such prohibitions. Indeed, the United States has sought this ob-
jective when in the past its industries were threatened by the European
Community rules of origin.2 °3 Fortunately, GATT's newly created "Rule
of Origin Committee" allows its members to agree to prohibit the misuse
of rules of origin.2°
GATT members should extend the requirements for non-preferential




199. See supra Part II.B.
200. See supra Part II.A. 1.
201. See id. In addition, "effective coordination among the NAFTA parties for consis-
tent customs valuation will be necessary since any significant variation in methodology
could result in 'shopping' for the most favorable border or port." Hartman, supra note
175, at *1.
202. Steinberg, supra note 101, at 330.
203. See id.
204. See Uruguay GATT, supra note 25, D.l-14 art. 4(1); Steinberg, supra note 2, at
n. 161 and accompanying text.
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refuse unilaterally to improve NAFTA's rules of origin while other free
trade agreements use unfair interpretations. However, GATT allows
members to mandate fair use of rules of origin universally-in all free
trade areas and customs unions. To achieve NAFTA's goals, the United
States should harmonize its interpretation of the rules of origin with the
goals of free trade through both NAFTA and GATT.
CONCLUSION
Although NAFTA has appreciably improved upon CFTA's rules of
origin for automobiles, the most dangerous flaw remains-the value-ad-
ded component of the test. This rule is by its nature highly subjective.
Moreover, political sensitivity to trade issues exacerbates matters.
Therefore, NAFTA member states must harmonize the rules.
NAFTA mandates that member states unite to develop NAFTA rules
of origin interpretative guidelines. The member states should seize the
opportunity to align NAFTA's rules of origin interpretations with the
principles of GATT and ban the misuse of rules of origin in non-prefer-
ential settings. Extending the ban to NAFTA will improve political rela-
tions and increase foreign investment. Moreover, if adopted through
GATT measures, the prohibition on misuse of rules of origin would in-
crease the opportunities of United States businesses to trade in the Euro-
pean Community. In sum, although rules of origin of free trade
agreements necessarily bar some products from duty-free entry, well-
designed rules will afford free trade area member states substantial long
term benefits.

